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THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: 
THE 1982-1983 TERM 
Part II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Professor of Law 
Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of a two-part article reviewing the 
significant decisions involving criminal procedure decid-
ed by the Supreme Court last Term. Part I appeared in 
the last issue. 
Comment on Silence 
(• 1.:. ( I 
September-October 1983 
Z; FIFTH AMENDMENT 
In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the 
Supreme Court ruled that prosecutorial comment 
on a defendant's failure to testify placed an un-
constitutional burden on the Fifth Amendement 
guarantee against self-incrimination. In U.S. v. 
Hastings, 103 S. Ct. 1974 (1983), the Seventh Cir-
cuit had refused to apply the harmless error rule to 
a Griffin violation. The Supreme Court construed 
the Seventh Circuit disposition of the case as an 
exercise of that court's supervisory powers to dis-
cipline prosecutors. 
Refusal to Submit to Intoxication Test 
In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), 
the Court held that a compelled blood-alcohol test 
did not violate the Fifth Amendment. Although the 
Court recognized that such a procedure involved 
"complusion" and "incriminating evidence," it 
concluded that the Fifth Amendment was intended 
to prohibit only the compelled production of testi-
monial or communicative evidence, not real or 
physical evidence. Last Term, in South Dakota v. 
Neville, 103 S. Ct. 916 (1983), the Court addressed 
an issue left unresolved in Schmerber: whether evi· 
dence of a defendant's refusal to submit to a 
blood-alcohol test violated the Fifth Amendment. 
The South Dakota Supreme Court had held that 
such a refusal was "a tacit or overt expression and 
communication of defendant's thoughts" and thus 
covered by the Fifth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court reversed. It did not, however, 
hold that the defendant's refusal to take the test 
was not communicative or testimonial. Instead, the 
Court ruled that the request to take the test did 
not constitute complusion within the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment. The Court reasoned that 
since the state could compel the defendant to take 
the test under Schmerber, the offering of an option 
to refuse the test and attaching penalties to the 
exercise of that option (i.e., admission of the evi-
dence at trail), was valid. /d. at 923. In a footnote, 
the Court also pointed out that "a police inquiry of 
whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test 
is not an interrogation within the meaning of 
Miranda." /d. at 923 n.15. 
In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, the 
Court reviewed the policies underlying the super-
visory powers, under which federal courts may for-
mulate procedural rules not specifically required 
by the Constitution or the Congress. These powers 
are used (1) to implement a remedy for violation of 
recognized rights, (2) to preserve judicial integrity 
by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate 
considertions validly before the jury, and (3) as a 
remedy designed to deter illegal conduct. /d. at 
1978-79. According to the Court, the first two poli-
cies are not implicated where an error is harmless. 
"Supervisory power ... is not needed as a remedy 
when the error to which it is addressed is harm-
less since by definition, the conviction would have 
been obtained notwithstanding the asserted error." 
/d. at 1979. In addition, the integrity of the process 
rationale "carries less weight" because under the 
harmless error doctrine the judgment stands only 
if there is no reasonable doubt that the error con-
tributed to the conviction. 
Finally, the deterrence rationale is not applic-
able where the prosecutorial comment "is at most 
an attenuated violation of Griffin and where means 
more narrowly tailored to deter objectionable pro-
secutorial conduct are available." /d. In a footnote, 
the Court pointed out that the lower court could 
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have ordered the prosecutor to show cause why he 
should not be disciplined, or requested the Justice 
Department to initiate disciplinary proceedings, or 
chastised the prosecutor publicly in the opinion. 
ld. at 1979 n.5. The Court went on to conclude that 
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
Immunity 
Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 103 S. Ct. 608 (1983}, in-
volved a grant of immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 
6002. Conboy was granted use immunity when he 
appeared before a federal grand jury investigating 
price-fixing under the antitrust laws. In subsequent 
civil litigation, a federal district court ordered that 
his immunized testimony be made available to the 
civil litigants. Thereafter Conboy was deposed, at 
which time he was examined on his immunized 
testimony. When asked whether this testimony 
was true, he refused to answer on Fifth Amend-
ment grounds. In an opinion written by Justice 
Powell, the Court held that Conboy had properly in-
voked the Fifth Amendment. 
The Court offered two reasons for its decision. 
First, the federal immunity statute provides for on-
ly use and derivative use immunity, not transac-
tional immunity. If the civil deposition testimony 
were held to derive from his immunized grand jury 
testimony, more testimony would be immunized 
than the government had originally intended. More-
over, such a ruling would make it more difficult for 
the government to establish in a subsequent pro-
secution of Conboy that its evidence was not de-
rived from the deposition testimony. This result, in 
effect, would invest the deponent with transaction-
al immunity, a result not intended by Congress in 
enacting the federal immunity statute. 
Second, the deponent would be subjected to 
substantial risks in the event a court in a subse-
quent prosecution held that his deposition testi-
mony was not immunized. The Court wrote: "Un-
less the grant of immunity assures a witness that 
his incriminating testimony will not be used 
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution, 
the witness has not received the certain protection 
of his Fifth Amendment privilege that he has been 
forced to exchange." ld. at 616. 
HABEAS CORPUS 
State Court Factual Findings 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 103 S.Ct. 843 (1983}, in-
volved an Ohio conviction for aggravated murder 
with specifications, i.e., that the defendant had 
previously been convicted for a "purposeful killing 
of or attempt to kill another." RC 2929.04(A)(5). 
Lonberger argued that his prior Illinois conviction 
for attempted murder was unconstitutional be-
cause his guilty plea had not been voluntarily and 
intelligently made as required by Henderson v. 
Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976), and Boykin v. Ala· 
bama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969). If the plea was unconsti-
tutional, the conviction could not be used in the 
Ohio trial according to Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 
109 (1967). 
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The records of the Illinois proceedings were 
somewhat unclear, indicating that Lonberger had 
been informed at the time of his plea that he was 
being charged with "an attempt on Dorothy Max-
well, with a knife." No mention of attempted mur-
der appeared. Lonberger, however, had been ar-
raigned on the attempted murder charge and was 
represented by counsel at the time of his plea. The 
Ohio courts found that Lonberger understood that 
he was pleading guilty to attempted murder. The 
federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), pro-
vides for a presumption of correctioness .for state 
court factual findings. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 
U.S. 539 (1982). One of the exceptions to this pre-
sumption involves cases where a federal habeas 
court concludes that the factual determinations 
are not "fairly supported" by the record. 
According to a majority of the Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Rehnquist, "This deference requires 
that a federal habeas court more than simply dis-
agree with the state court before rejecting its fac-
tual determinations. Instead, it must conclude that 
the state court's findings lacked even 'fair[] sup-
port' in the record." 103 S. Ct. at 850. In addition, 
the Sixith Circuit apparently credited Lonberger's 
habeas testimony that he believed he pled guilty 
only to aggravated battery, not attempted murder. 
The Court disagreed with this assessment: "28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) gives federal habeas courts no li-
cense to redetermine credibility of witnesses 
whose demeanor has been observed by the state 
trial court, but not by them." ld. at 851. Thus, the 
Court concluded that the factual findings were 
supported by the record. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, disa-
greeing with the majority's resolution of the habe-
as issue. Of greater significance was Justice Ste-
vens' dissent, which was joined by three other Jus· 
tices. He questioned the continued validity of 
Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967), which upheld 
the admission at trail of a prior conviction for the 
purpose of punishment. He argued that Ohio's re-
fusal to use a bifurcated procedure in which the 
prior conviction could be admitted only after con-
viction was unconstitutional, especially in a case 
in which the defense offered to stipulate to the pri· 
or conviction. "[T]he tactics employed in this case 
dramatically unmask the true prosecutorial interest 
in preserving a one-stage procedure - to enhance 
the likelihood that the jury will convict." /d. at 863. 
The majority rejected this argument in a footnote. 
ld. at 853 n.6. 
Maggio v. Fulford, 103 S. Ct. 2261 (1983), also in-
volved federal habeas review of state court factual 
findings. At trial the defendant raised the issue of 
his mental competency to stand trial. The trial 
judge ruled that he was competent, a decision that 
the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed. On appeal 
in habeas proceedings, the Fifth Circuit disagreed. 
The Supreme Court reversed per curiam. Citing 
Sumner v. Mata, the majority stated that "the 
Court of Appeals erroneously substituted its own 
judgment as to the credibility of witnesses for that 
of the Lousiana courts - a prerogative which 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 does not allow it." /d. at 2262. 
Exhaustion of State Remedies 
The present Court's inclination to restrict federal 
habeas relief, was also evidenced in Anderson v. 
Harless, 103 S. Ct. 276 (1982). Harless was convict-
ed of first degree murder. On appeal, he claimed a 
jury instruction on "malice" had been "erroneous" 
and cited several state cases in support. After his 
appeal was rejected, he filed a habeas petition. 
The federal district court held the instruction un-
constitutional under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 
U.S. 510 (1979), because it shifted the burden of 
proof on the issue of malice to the defendant. The 
court also found that Harless had exhausted his 
state remedies as required by the habeas statute. 
The Sixth Circuit agreed. The Supreme Court did 
not. 
In a per curiam opinion, from which Justices 
Stevens, Brennan and Marshall dissented the 
Court held that Harless had failed to exh~ust his 
state remedies. The Court wrote: "It is not enough 
that all the facts necessary to support the federal 
claim were before the state courts ... or that a 
somewhat similar state-law claim was made ... the 
habeas petitioner must have 'fairly presented' to 
the state courts the 'substance' of his federal ha· 
beas corpus claim." /d. at 277. By merely claiming 
that the instruction was erroneous and citing state 
cases, Harless had failed to satisfy this require-
ment, and thus had not exhausted his state rem-
edies. 
Stone v. Powell 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Su-
preme Court placed substantial limitations on fed-
eral habeas review of alleged Fourth Amendment 
violations. Under Stone, such review is precluded 
where the prisoner has had an opportunity for a 
full and fair litigation of the Fourth Amendment 
claim in the state courts. In Cardwell v. Taylor, 103 
S. Ct. 2015 (1983), the Court reaffirmed Stone. 
Taylor i~itially challenged the admissibility of his 
confe~s1?n on the gro_und that it was not voluntary. 
The d1stnct court denied relief. On appeal the 
Ninth Circuit ruled that the statement may have 
been obtained in violation of Dunaway v. New 
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1975), in which the Supreme 
Court had held that statements obtained while a 
defendant was illegally detained at a stationhouse 
were inadmissible as fruit of the poisonous tree. 
Dunaway, however, was decided on Fourth Amend· 
ment, not Fifth Amendment, grounds. The Supreme 
Court held in Taylor that Stone controlled and 
therefore consideration of this issue was preclud-
ed. "Only if the statements are involuntary, and 
therefore obtained in violation of the Fifth Amend· 
ment could the federal courts grant relief on collat-
eral review." /d. at 2016. 
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
Aggravating Circumstances 
The Court returned to constitutionality of impos-
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ing capital punishment in Zant v. Stephens, 103 S. 
Ct. 2733 (1983). Stephens was convicted of murder 
~nd in the penalty phase of the trial the jury explic-
Itly found that three of the aggravating circumstan-
ces, which trigger capital punishment under the 
Georgia statute, had been proven beyond a reason-
able doubt. The jury imposed the death sentence. 
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held, based 
o~ an earlier decision, that one of the aggravating 
Circumstances - a substantial history of serious 
assaultive criminal convictions - was unconstitu-
tionally vague. Nevertheless, the state court 
upheld the imposition of the death penalty. The 
defendant challenged this ruling. 
After reviewing the state capital punishment 
scheme and finding no constitutional objections to 
it, the Court turned its attention to the argument 
that the invalidity of one o. the statutory aggra-
vating circumstances underlying the jury's sen-
tencing verdict invalidated the death sentence. The 
defendant's argument rested on his interpretation 
of Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
According to the Court, Stromberg establishes 
two related but different rules. First, Stromberg 
"requires that a general verdict must be set aside 
if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any 
of two or more independent grounds, and one of 
those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict 
may have rested exclusively on the insufficient 
ground." !d. at 2745. Stephens did not come within 
this rule because he jury did not return a general 
verdict, but rather made specific findings that each 
aggravating circumstance had been proven. Sec· 
ond, Stromberg encompasses a situation in which 
a general verdict on a single-count indictment 
rested on both a constitutional and an unconstitu-
tional ground. Because such cases involve First 
Amendment rights, the Court found them inapplic· 
able to Stephens' case. 
Finally, the Court held that evidence of the 
Stephan's past criminal record, which had been 
admitted to establish the invalid aggravating cir· 
cumstance, would have been admissible in any 
event during the penalty phase and thus did not 
impermissively prejudice him. 
The Court also addressed the use of aggravating 
factors in Barclay v. Florida, 103 S. Ct. 3418 (1983). 
The Florida capital sentencing scheme requires a 
jury determination on the merits, a jury recommen-
dation on the death penalty, and a trial judge sen-
tencing decision. In imposing the death penalty, 
the trial court is required to make three findings: 
(1) that at least one statutory aggravating factor is 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) that the 
statutory aggravating circumstances are not 
outweighed by statutory mitigating circumstances 
and (3) tha,t death is an appropriate sentence for ' 
the individual defendant. 
The principal issue in Barclay involved the trial 
court's consideration of a nonstatutory aggravat-
ing circumstance - the defendant's prior record 
- in imposing the death sentence. Under Florida 
law, nonstatutory aggravating circumstances may 
not be considered. Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 
plurality, held that consideration of a nonstatutory 
aggravating circumstance, even if contrary to state 
law, did not violate the U.S. Constitution. He noted 
that the imposition of the death penalty based 
solely on nonstatutory aggravating circumstances 
would be a different matter. In Barclay, however, 
statutory aggravating circumstances had been 
found. Justice Stevens, along with Justice Powell, 
concurred on this issue; Justice Brennan and Mar-
shall dissented. 
Expedited Appeals; Future Prediction of 
Dangerousness 
Barefoot v. Estelle, 103 S. Ct. 3383 (1983), pre-
sented the Court with two different issues. The 
first involved the procedures used by federal 
courts in reviewing habeas petitions in capital 
cases. The second issue involved the constitution-
ality of using expert predictions of future danger-
ousness in imposing the death penalty. 
Barefoot was convicted of the murder of a police 
officer. In the sentencing phase, the jury was in-
structed, as provided by a Texas statute, to deter-
mine whether "there is a probability that the defen-
dant would commit criminal acts of violence that 
would constitute a continuing threat to society." 
The jury answered in the affirmative, and the de-
fendant was sentenced to death. After the defen-
dant exhausted his state appellate and habeas 
remedies, he filed a federal habeas petition. When 
the federal district court rejected the petition, the 
defendant filed a motion with the Fifth Circuit re-
questing a stay of execution pending an appeal 
from the denial of the petition. The Fifth Circuit 
considered the merits of the appeal at the same 
time it considered the stay of execution. 
In addressing the procedural issue, the Supreme 
Court, speaking through Justice White, comment-
ed: "Approving the execution of a defendant be-
fore his appeal is decided on the merits would 
clearly be improper .... However, a practice of de-
ciding the merits of an appeal, when possible, to-
gether with the application for a stay, is not incon-
sistent with our cases." !d. at 3392. The Fifth Cir-
cuit followed the latter procedure in Barefoot and 
the Court found no error in this practice, provided 
the defendant is given an adequate opportunity to 
address the merits of the appeal. The Court wrote: 
"The parties addressed the merits and were given 
unlimited time to present argument .... The pri-
mary issue presented had been briefed and argued 
throughout the proceedings in the state courts and 
rebriefed and reargued in the District Court's 
habeas corpus proceeding." !d. at 3392-93. 
The Court went on to provide guidelines for 
stays of execution and habeas appeals. First, a pe-
titioner is required by statute to obtain a certifi-
cate of probable cause to appeal. This requirement 
is intended to separate meritorious from frivolous 
appeals. According to the Court, a certificate of 
probable cause requires the petitioner to make a 
substantial showing of the denial of a federal 
right. Second, if a certificate of probable cause is 
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issued by the district or appellate court, the peti-
tioner must be afforded an opportunity to address 
the merits of the appeal. "Accordingly, a circuit 
court, where necessary to prevent the case from 
becoming moot by the petitioner's execution, 
should grant a stay of execution pending disposi-
tion of an appeal when a condemned prisoner ob-
tains a certificate of probable cause on his initial 
habeas appeal." /d. at 3394. 
Third, appellate courts may adopt expedited pro-
cedures in resolving the merits of habeas appeals, 
notwithstanding the issuance of a certificate of 
probable cause, provided counsel has adequate 
opportunity to address the merits. "If appropriate 
notice is provided, argument on the merits may be 
heard at the same time the motion .for a stay is 
considered .... " /d. at 3395. Fourth, successive 
habeas petitions may be dismissed if no new or 
different grounds for relief are alleged. Even if dis-
missal is not appropriate, district courts may expe-
dite consideration of a petition. "The granting of a 
stay should reflect the presence of substantial 
grounds upon which relief might be granted." /d. 
Fifth, stays of execution are not automatic pen-
ding the filing and consideration of a petition for a 
writ of certiorari from the Court. 
The issue on the merits involved the admissibili-
ty of expert psychiatric testimony concerning the 
defendant's future dangerousness. Two experts 
testified about future dangerousness in response 
to hypothetical questions. Neither had personally 
examined the defendant. Reaffirming Jurek v. Tex-
as, 428 U.S. 262 (1976), the Court held that future 
dangerousness was a valid consideration in death 
penalty cases. Consequently, expert testimony on 
dangerousness was admissible. Although the 
Court recognized that there is a dispute about 
whether such expert predictions are valid, the 
Court observed: "We are unconvinced, however, at 
least as of now, that the adversary process cannot 
be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreli-
able evidence and opinion about future dangerous-
ness, particularly when the convicted felon has the 
opportunity to present his own side of the case." 
/d. at 3398. Moveover, the use of hypothetical 
questions and the lack of a personal examination 
of the defendant by the experts were not unconsti-
tutional. 
Justice Marshall, along with Justice Brennan, 
dissented. He focused on the Court's sanctioning 
of expedited procedures in capital cases: "If full 
briefing and argument are generally regarded as 
necessary to fair and careful review of a nonfrivo-
lous appeal - and they are - there is absolutely 
no justification for providing fewer procedural pro-
tections solely because a man's life is at stake." 
/d. at 3404. Justice Blackmun also dissented. He 
focused on the merits. Relying on research con-
cerning predictions of future dangerousness, he 
criticized the Court for permitting expert predictive 
testimony "despite the fact that such testimony is 
wrong two times out of three." /d. at 3406. 
~I 
Commutation Instruction 
California law requires the trial court in a capital 
sentencing proceeding to instruct the jury that the 
Governor has the power to grant a reprieve, pardon 
or commute a sentence of life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole. The instruction was 
given in Ramos v. California, 103 S. Ct. 3446 (1983), 
and the jury imposed death. The California Su-
preme Court reversed, finding the instruction viola-
tive of federal constitutional law. The U.S. Su-
preme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, 
disagreed. According to the Court, the "instruction 
does not violate any of the substantive limitations 
this Court's precedents have imposed on the capi-
tal sentencing process. It does not preclude indi-
vidualized sentencing determinations or consider-
ation of mitigating factors, nor does it impermis-
sively inject an element too speculative for the 
jury's deliberation. Finally, its failure to inform the 
jury also of the Governor's power to commute a 
death sentence does not render it constitutionally 
infirm." /d. at 3459. 
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dis-
sented. 
CRIMINAL PRESUMPTIONS 
In Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979), the 
Court held an instruction informing the jury that 
"the law presumes that a person intends the ordin-
ary consequences of voluntary acts" violated the 
due process clause. Sandstrom, however, left un-
resolved the question of whether such an instruc-
tion could be considered harmless error. The Court 
addressed this issue in Connecticut v. Johnson, 
1 03 S. Ct. 969 (1983). 
Johnson was charged with attempted murder, 
kidnapping, robbery, and sexual assault. The de-
fense theory was that the defendant did not intend 
to kill the victim or permanently keep her car. Dur-
ing the jury instructions, the trial court stated, 
"However, you should be aware of a rule of law 
that wi II be he I pfu I to you and that is that a per-
son's intention may be inferred from his conduct 
and every person is conclusively presumed to in-
tend the natural and necessary consequences of 
his act." /d. at 973. There was little question that 
the instruction was erroneous under Sandstrom; 
the issue was whether it was could be considered 
harmless error under Chapman v. California, 386 
u.s. 18 (1967). 
Writing for a plurality, Justice Blackmun held 
that only in rare situations could a Sandstrom vio-
lation be considered harmless error. According to 
the plurality, an "erroneous presumption on a dis-
puted element of the crime renders irrelevant the 
evidence on the issue because the jury may have 
relied upon the presumption rather than upon that 
evidence .... The fact that the reviewing court 
may view the evidence of intent as overwhelming 
is then simply irrelevant." /d. at 977. As examples 
of the "rare situations in which the reviewing court 
can be confident that a Sandstrom error did not 
Play any role in the jury verdict," Justice Blackmun 
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cited a case in which the defendant concedes the 
issue of intent and presents an afirmative defense, 
and a case in which the defendant is acquitted on 
the erroneously instructed charge and convicted of 
an unrelated offense. /d. at 977-78. 
The precedential value of the opinion, however, 
is undercut by Justice Stevens concurring opinion; 
he cast the fifth vote affirming the judgment. Jus-
tice Stevens did not believe that the case present-
ed a federal question and only concurred in order 
to allow the lower court's judgment to stand. The 
four dissenting Justices not only found the harm-
less error doctrine applicable to Sandstrom errors 
but that a court reviewing the trial record could 
"well say beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury 
found the presumption unnecessary to its task of 
determining intent." /d. at 985. 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
In Missouri v. Hunter, 103 S. Ct. 673 (1983), the 
Court addressed the issue of multiple punishments 
under the double jeopardy clause. Based on his 
participation in a robbery of an A&P store in which 
he had used a weapon, Hunter was convicted of 
first degree robbery and armed criminal action. Un-
der Missouri law, armed criminal action is defined 
as the commission of any felony under the laws of 
Missouri by, with, or through the use, assistance 
or aid of a dangerous or deadly weapon. /d. at 676. 
Armed criminal action is a separate offense pun-
ished by a term of not less than three years. The 
defendant was sentenced to concurrent terms of 
tens years for first degree robbery and fifteen 
years for armed criminal action. On appeal, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that armed criminal 
action and the underlying felony were "the same 
offense" for purposes of the double jeopardy 
clause and therefore the imposition of punishment 
for both offenses was prohibited. 
The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. Ac-
cording to the Court, "[w]ith respect to cumulative 
sentences imposed in a single trial, the double 
jeapordy clause does no more than prevent the 
sentencing court from prescribing greater punish-
ment than the legislature intended." /d. at 678. In a 
subsequent passage, the Court wrote that "simply 
because two criminal statutes may be construed 
to proscribe the same conduct ... does not mean 
that the double jeapordy clause precludes the 
imposition, in a single trial, of cumulative punish-
ments pursuant to those statutes." /d. at 679. 
Since the Missouri Supreme Court had found that 
the legislature specifically intended to impose cu-
mulative punishments, Hunter had suffered no 
constitutional deprivation. 
RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Meaningful Relationship 
In Morris v. Slappy, 103 S. Ct. 1610 (1983), the de-
fendant was convicted of robbery, burglary, false 
imprisonment, rape, and forcible oral copulation. A 
public defender, named Goldfine, was assigned to 
represent him. Goldfine served as counsel at the 
' i ~ 
preliminary hearing and conducted an extensive in-
vestigation. After Goldfine was hospitalized for 
emergency surgery, a second public defender, Hot-
chkiss, was assigned to the case. This occured six 
days before trial. On the first day of trial, the de-
fendant told the court that he had been repre-
sented by the new attorney for only several days. 
Construing this statement as a request for a con-
tinuance, the trial court denied the motion. Hot-
chkiss stated that he was prepared to try the case 
and Slappy stated that he was satisfied with his 
attorney. On the second day the defendant again 
raised the issue of his attorney's preparedness. On 
the third day the defendant stated that Goldfine, 
not Hotchkiss, was his attorney and thereafter 
refused to cooperate with Hotchkiss. 
Subsequently, Slappy filed a habeas petition. 
The federal district court considered two issues: 
whether the trial court abused its discretion in de-
nying a continuance (1) for Hotchkiss to prepare 
and (2) to permit Goldfine to defend Slappy. Both 
issues were decided against the defendant. On ap-
peal, the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel would "be with-
out substance if it did not include the right to a 
meaningful attorney-client relationship." /d. at 
1615. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by the Chief 
Justice, reversed. The Court, relying on Hotchkiss' 
representations that he was prepared to go to trial, 
rejected the argument that a continuance should 
have been granted. In addition, the Court ques-
tioned the defendant's motives in requesting Gold-
fine on the third day of trial, after he had stated he 
was satisfied with Hotchkiss on the first day. 
According to the Court, the request could be con-
strued as "a transparent ploy for delay." /d. 1617. 
On the most important aspect of the case, the 
Chief Justice wrote: 
The Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel "would be without sub-
stance if it did not include the right to a meaningful 
attorney-client relationship," ... is without basis in the 
law. No authority was cited for this novel ingredient of 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel, and of 
course none could be. No court could possibly gua-
rantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rap-
port with his attorney - privately retained or provided 
by the public- that the Court of Appeals thought 
part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel. 
Accordingly, we reject the claim that the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees a "meaningful relationship" between 
an accused and his counsel. !d. at 1617. 
Justice Brennan, along with Justice Marshall, 
concurred in the result. He wrote, however, that 
the case should have been decided against Slappy 
because he had failed to make a timely request for 
Goldfine. He rejected the majority's Sixth Amend-
ment analysis: "But where an indigent defendant 
wants to preserve a relationship he has developed 
with counsel already appointed by the court, I can 
perceive no rational or fair basis for failing at least 
to consider this interest in determining whether 
continued representation is possible." /d. at 1622. 
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Justice Blackmun, along with Justice Stevens, al-
so concurred, finding "the Court's broad-ranging 
dicta about the right to counsel ... unnecessary in 
this case." /d. at 1625. 
On Appeal 
Jones v. Barnes, 103 S. Ct. 3308 (1983), raised 
the issue of whether an indigent defendant has a 
constitutional right to compel his appointed at-
torney to argue nonfrivolous issues on appeal. 
Barnes was convicted of robbery and assault. He 
was assigned counsel for appeal and subsequently 
sent a letter to this attorney outlining issues for 
the appeal. The attorney accepted some of these 
issues and rejected others. In his appellate brief, 
he included three issues. He also submitted a pro 
se brief written by the defendant. At oral argument, 
the attorney pressed only the issues raised in his 
brief. In subsequent habeas proceeding, the Sec-
ond Circuit ruled that this was error. According to 
that court, when a defendant requests that his at-
torney raise additional colorable points on appeal, 
counsel must argue the additional points to the 
full extent of his professional ability. On review, a 
majority of the Supreme Court, speaking through 
the Chief Justice, disagreed. 
The defendant's argument rested upon his inter-
pretation of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), in which the Court had held that appointed 
counsel may not withdraw from a nonfrivolous ap-
peal. In Barnes the majority distinguished Anders, 
believing that Anders required an attorney to pur-
sue nonfrivolous appeals but not all nonfrivolous 
issues: "Neither Anders nor any other decision of 
this Court suggests ... that the indigent defendant 
has a constitutional right to compel appointed 
counsel to press nonfrivolous points requested by 
the client, if counsel, as a matter of professional 
judgment, decides not to present those points." /d. 
at 3312. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented on the 
grounds that the Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel requires that the defendant, not the attorney, 
have the determinative voice in deciding which 
issues will be pursued on appeal. Justice Black-
mun concurred. 
PROBATION REVOCATION 
The defendant in Beardon v. Georgia, 103 S. Ct. 
2064 (1983), was placed on probation after being 
convicted of burglary and receiving stolen proper 
ty. As a condition of probation, he was required to 
pay a $500 fine and $250 in restitution. He bar- . 
rowed $200 to pay the first installment, but lost hiS 
job prior to paying the remainder. Consequently, 
his probation was revoked. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, held that 
automatically revoking probation when a proba-
tioner has made all reasonable efforts to pay a 
fine or restitution and yet cannot do so through no 
fault of his own violated the constitutional precept 
of fundamental fairness. According to the Court, 
under these circumstances the trial court "must 
consider alternate measures of punishment other 
than imprisonment." /d. at 2073. As examples of al-
ternative measures, the Court cited an extension 
of the time for making payments, reduction of the 
fine, or the performance of some form of labor or 
public service in lieu of the fine. By failing to con-
sider these alternatives, the trial court automatical-
ly turned a fine into a prison sentence. 
The Court distinquished Bearden's situation 
from other circumstances. First, "if the probationer 
has willfully refused to pay the fine or restitution 
when he has the means to pay, the State is per-
fectly justified in using imprisonment as a sanc-
tion to enforce collection." /d. at 2070. Second, "a 
probationer's failure to make sufficient bona fide 
efforts to seek employment or borrow money in 
order to pay the fine or restitution may reflect an 
insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes to 
society for his crime." /d. Accordingly, revocation 
of probation would be justified. 
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT 
In recent years the Court has not been receptive 
to arguments that imposition of noncapital sen-
tences violates the cruel and unusual punishment 
clause because they are disproportionate to the of-
fense. See Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980); 
Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 374 (1981). In Solem v. 
Helm, 33 Grim. L. Rptr. 3220 (1983), the Court, in a 
5-4 opinion, reversed this trend and overturned a 
sentence based upon the proportionality principle. 
Helm was convicted of uttering a "no account" 
check for $100. Because he had been convicted of 
six prior offenses, he was sentenced under a re-
cidivist statute to life imprisonment without parole. 
He subsequently challenged the sentence as 
violative of the Eighth Amendment. 
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, rejected 
the state's assertion that the proportionality princi-
ple did not apply to felony prison sentences: "[W]e 
hold as a matter of principle that a criminal sen-
tence must be proportionate to the crime for which 
the defendant has been convicted." /d. at 3223. In 
reviewing a sentence to determine if it is dispro-
portionate, the Court specified three "objective 
criteria:" (1) the gravity of the offense and the 
harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences im-
posed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; 
and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of 
the same crime in other jurisdictions. /d. at 
3223-24. 
In applying these criteria, the Court pointed out 
that the crime for which Helm was convicted in-
volved neither violence nor the threat of violence; 
nor did it involve a large amount. Moreover, his 
prior felonies were for relatively minor nonviolent 
offenses. In contrast, the sentence of life imprison-
ment without parole is only surpassed in severity 
by capital punishment. Thus, "Helm has received 
the penultimate sentence for relatively minor crimi-
nal conduct." /d. at 3227. As to the other criteria, 
the Court concluded that Helm "has been treated 
more harshly than other criminals in the State who 
have committed more serious crimes. He has been 
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treated more harshly than he would have been in 
any other jurisdiction, with the possible exception 
of a single State." /d. 
The Chief Justice, along with Justices White, 
Rehnquist, and O'Connor, dissented, arguing that 
the Court had ignored the precedent established in 
Rummel v. Estelle. 
INSANITY ACQUITEE 
The defendant in Jones v. U.S., 103 S. Ct. 3043 
(1983), was charged with attempting to steal a 
jacket, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum 
term of one year. Jones entered a plea of not guilty 
by reason of insanity, an affirmative defense estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence. The 
trial court accepted the plea, and Jones was com-
mitted to a mental hospital. Under the D.C. statute, 
Jones was subject to release if he established by 
a preponderance of evidence that he was entitled 
to release. After being hospitalized for more than a 
year, the maximum period he could have served in 
prison if he had been convicted, Jones petitioned 
the court to either release him unconditionally or 
initiate civil commitment proceedings. Jones' argu-
ment was based on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418 (1979), in which the Court held that due pro-
cess requires the Government in a civil commit-
ment proceeding to demonstrate by clear and con-
vincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill 
and dangerous. The Supreme Court, speaking 
through Justice Powell, rejected Jones' arguments. 
His initial point was that an insanity verdict 
does not establish present mental illness or dan-
gerousness. According to the Court, such a verdict 
establishes two facts: (1) that the defendant com-
mitted the criminal act, and (2) that he committed 
it because of mental illness. The finding that he 
committed a criminal act indicates that he is dan-
gerous. Moreover, "[i]t comports with common 
sense to conclude that someone whose mental ill-
ness was sufficient to lead him to commit a crim-
inal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treat-
ment." 103 S. Ct. 3050. 
Jones next argued that his indefinite commit-
ment was unconstitutional because proof of insan-
ity was based on a preponderance of the evidence, 
rather than Addington's civil commitment standard 
of clear and convincing evidence. Again the Court 
disagreed. The Addington standard rested on a 
concern that a person could be confined civilly on 
the basis of "some abnormal behavior which might 
be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental 
or emotional disorder, but which is in fact within a 
range of conduct that is generally acceptable." /d. 
at 3051. According to the court, this concern is not 
present in the case of an insanity acquittee be· 
cause only the acquittee can advance and estab-
lish the insanity defense, and proof that he com-
mitted a criminal act eliminates the risk that he is 
being committed only for "idiosyncratic behavior." 
Finally, Jones contended that due process was 
violated because he had been committed for a 
longer period than he could have been imprisoned 
had he been convicted. The Court rejected this ar-
gument as well. Incarceration for a crime is 
based on a different rationale than commitment 
after an insanity acquittal. "There simply is no 
necessary correlation between severity of the of-
fense and length of time necessary for recovery." 
/d. at 3052. 
Justice Brennan, in a opinion joined by Justices 
Blackmun and Marshall, dissented. He pointed out 
that an insanity verdict "is backward-looking, fo-
cusing on one moment in the past, while commit-
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ment requires a judgment as to the present and fu-
ture." /d. 3056. Moreover, the "[r]esearch is prac-
tically nonexistent on the relationship of non-vio-
lent criminal behavior, such as petitioner's attempt 
to shoplift, to future dangerousness." /d. at 3057. 
Justice Stevens also dissented, concluding that 
the insanity verdict was sufficient to justify the in-
itial commitment but that once the defendant has 
served the maximum punishment authorized, the 
Government must establish the need tor continued 
commitment by clear and convincing evidence. 
